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Ticket-splitting in mixed-member systems: 
On the importance of seat linkage between electoral tiers 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In mixed-member electoral systems, voters usually have two votes: a nominal and a list vote. 
According to some studies, voters are increasingly using them to cast a split-ticket vote. 
However, we know very little about whether the type of mixed-member system, and in 
particular whether the allocation of seats across tiers is linked or not, creates different sets of 
incentives for this behaviour. We provide new insights into the topic by analysing survey data 
from seven countries and 18 elections since 1990. We find that the proportion of split-ticket 
votes is larger in mixed-member proportional than in mixed-member majoritarian systems. 
Our results suggest that voters understand the operation of the electoral system and its 
consequences for the distribution of seats among parties, and adapt their behaviour 
accordingly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Although mixed-member systems were extremely rare before 1990, many democracies 
around the world now use these systems to elect national representatives (Bormann and 
Golder 2013). Under this set of rules, voters typically have two votes: a nominal vote (usually 
in a single-member district [SMD] with plurality rule) and a list vote (always in a 
proportional representation [PR] multi-member district).1 Some voters use these two votes to 
support different parties. This is typically referred to as a split-ticket vote (Gschwend 2007). 
Previous studies have found that a substantial proportion of voters cast split-ticket votes: 
around 20% in Germany in 1998 (Pappi and Thurner 2002), 25% in Japan in 2000 (Burden 
2009), and 39% in New Zealand in 2002 (Vowles 2005). Understanding split-ticket voting is, 
thus, crucial to give sense out of voting behaviour in mixed-member systems. 
 
Split-ticket voting has attracted a lot of scholarly attention in the last decades. The end of 
cleavage politics (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992), the declining importance of party 
identification (Holmberg 2007), and the increasing frequency of split-ticket voting (Dalton, 
McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000) have fuelled the academic interest in this behaviour. Split-
ticket voting has been usually considered as a form of strategic voting (Bawn 1999; 
Herrmann and Pappi 2008; Gschwend 2007; Karp et al. 2002; Moser and Scheiner 2009; 
Reed 1999). Strategic voting refers to the decision of some citizens to vote for a party that is 
not their most preferred one as a way to maximize the probability that their vote will affect 
the electoral outcome (Cox 1997). Likewise, strategic split-ticket voting is said to occur when 
                                                 
1 There is more variety in mixed-member electoral systems than what is described here. In some mixed-member 
systems (e.g., Mexico), voters are allowed to cast only one vote. Also, some countries use a majority runoff 
(e.g., Lithuania) or a single non-transferable vote system (e.g., Venezuela) at the nominal tier. In this article, 
nominal, majoritarian and single-member districts, on the one hand, and list, proportional and multi-member 
districts, on the other, are used interchangeably to refer to the two tiers of a mixed-member electoral system. 
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voters understand that the logic of seat allocation is different in the SMD and PR tiers of the 
mixed-member system (in particular, that it is much harder for a small party to be elected in 
the SMD than in the PR tier) and adapt their behaviour accordingly. Hence, it typically 
concerns supporters of small parties who cast a split-ticket vote when they consider that their 
favourite party has little chances of winning in the SMD tier (so they give their nominal vote 
to a larger party) but have reasonable chances of obtaining at least one seat in the PR tier (so 
they stick to their favourite party for the list vote). 
 
In this paper, we propose a theory that distinguishes between the two main types of mixed-
member systems: mixed-member proportional systems (MMP) for which the two electoral 
tiers are linked, and mixed-member majoritarian systems (MMM) for which they are not 
(following the typology of Shugart and Wattenberg 2001, see below). If we assume that 
voters primarily care about the partisan composition of parliament, they have a stronger 
incentive to cast both votes for their preferred party when there is no seat linkage between the 
two electoral tiers than where there is one. As a consequence, we should observe a larger 
proportion split-ticket votes in MMPs systems. We show empirical evidence supporting this 
theory using survey data from seven countries and 18 elections held under mixed-member 
rules since 1990. 
 
We believe that this paper makes two important contributions to the voting behaviour and 
electoral systems literature. First, although there have been numerous case studies of how 
voters behave under mixed-member rules (Bawn 1999; Gschwend 2007; Gschwend, Johnston 
and Pattie 2003; Herrmann and Pappi 2008; Jesse 1988; Karp et al. 2002; Pappi and Thurner 
2002; Reed 1999; Schoen 1999), there have been less comparative works on this topic (see 
Kostadinova 2002; Moser and Scheiner 2005, 2009; Plescia 2016 for exceptions). In focusing 
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on one country, most of the literature has neglected a crucial feature of these electoral 
systems: whether the allocation of seats in the SMD tier depends on the allocation of seats in 
the PR tier. This paper, thus, contributes to our understanding of electoral behaviour under 
mixed-member rules. 
 
Second, the paper highlights the need for researchers to consider electoral rules in their full 
complexity. We find that a feature that might have been considered as anecdotal by some 
authors, i.e. whether the two tiers are linked or not, creates different sets of incentives for 
voters. Therefore, a careful analysis of the details of the electoral systems is crucial to make 
sense out of voting behaviour. 
 
TICKET-SPLITTING IN MIXED-MEMBER SYSTEMS 
 
Mixed-members systems have attracted much scholarly attention these last twenty-five years. 
From a normative point of view, mixed-member systems are sometimes considered as 
superior as they bring ‘the best of both worlds’ in terms of electoral representation (Shugart 
and Wattenberg 2001): The personal representation of citizens is ensured by the candidates 
elected in the SMD tier whereas the PR tier guarantees that the seat share of each party is 
proportional to its vote share. The literature on mixed-member systems has been particularly 
focused on explaining split-ticket voting mostly by resorting to voters’ strategic motivations. 
The observation that the difference in parties’ vote shares across the tiers increases as the race 
at the SMD level gets closer suggests that supporters of small parties perceive the importance 
of their nominal vote when the SMD contest is tight and cast, as a result, a split-ticket vote: 
they vote for their preferred party in the PR tier, but choose one of the two top contenders in 
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the SMD tier in order to increase the chances of this party to be elected (Bawn 1999; Moser 
and Scheiner 2005, 2009). 
 
Along these lines, Gschwend, Johnston and Pattie (2003) demonstrate that the two largest 
German parties – the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) – are 
the main beneficiaries of split-ticket voting in the SMD tier due to the support of voters of 
smaller parties of the same ideological bloc (the Free Democratic Party [FDP] and the Green 
Party, respectively) who act strategically. In the same vein, Gschwend and Pappi (2004) 
argue that the clarity of the ideological blocs and the coalition alternatives have significantly 
increased the share of split-ticket votes in that country over time. Finally, Herrmann and 
Pappi (2008), Gschwend (2007), Karp et al. (2002), and Pappi and Thurner (2002) show that 
many split-ticket voters in mixed-member systems can be labelled as strategic as they desert 
the candidate of their preferred party in the SMD tier if this candidate has little chance of 
winning. 
 
Yet, strategic split-ticket voting in elections conducted under mixed-member rules can also 
benefit small parties (Shikano, Herrmann, and Turner 2009). Meffert and Gschwend (2011) 
argue that in coalition-government systems supporters of large parties sometimes adopt a 
‘threshold insurance’ strategy, and vote for the potentially junior partner of their preferred 
party to ensure that it passes the representation threshold and obtains some parliamentary 
seats. In doing so, they increase the probability that their preferred coalition government, i.e. 
the one led by their preferred party, is formed. In Germany, for example, the supporters of the 
CDU-CSU sometimes vote for its junior coalition partner (FDP) in the PR tier if they suspect 
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this small party might not receive enough votes to pass the 5% national threshold.2 In doing 
so, they also express a preference for a particular government coalition (Jesse 1988; Pappi 
and Thurner 2002). Although, in reality, parties do sometimes invite voters to cast threshold 
insurance votes (Roberts 1988), empirical results about the existence of this behaviour are at 
best mixed: whereas some studies find evidence about it (e.g., Gschwend 2007), others do not 
(e.g., Pappi and Thurner 2002).  
 
Several scholars argue that an important portion of split-ticket votes might just be random 
and provoked by voters’ incomprehension of the electoral system. Jesse (1988) and Schoen 
(1999) claim that a substantial amount of split-ticket votes in Germany does not fulfil basic 
criteria of rationality and cannot be characterized as strategic. In fact, they show that there are 
between 13 and 21% of ‘strategically wrong’ split-ticket voters who cast a ballot for a large 
and a small party in the PR and the SMD tier, respectively. However, these studies do not 
take into consideration that voters have preferences for individual candidates. As Plescia 
(2016) notes, many voters have a strong allegiance to one of the candidates competing in the 
SMD tier. When this candidate does not belong to their preferred party, they will have a high 
likelihood of voting for different parties across the electoral tiers. In doing so, they will cast a 
‘sincere’ split-ticket vote.  
 
THE EFFECT OF THE TYPE OF MIXED-MEMBER SYSTEM 
 
In textbooks, the main line of division within the family of mixed-member systems is 
whether there is a seat linkage between the SMD and the PR tiers. When such a linkage 
                                                 
2 With 4.7% of the national vote in the PR tier, the FDP did not reach the 5% representation threshold in the 
2013 German federal election and, hence, the party failed to obtain any seat in the national parliament for the 
first time in its history.  
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exists, mixed-member systems are called proportional, and when it does not, we call them 
majoritarian (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). MMM systems operate as if there were two 
simultaneous elections conducted under two different rules: one election held under 
plurality/majority usually in SMDs (the nominal tier) and one election held under PR (the list 
tier). In MMP systems, the PR tier is meant to compensate potential deviations from the 
principle of proportionality between parties’ votes and seats shares created by the SMD tier. 
There is a first allocation of seats in the SMD tier, and then the remaining seats are given to 
parties as for the partisan composition of the overall parliament corresponds to their vote 
share in the PR tier. 3  In Sartori’s (1997: 73) words, the ‘proportion’ prevails over the 
‘disproportion’ under MMP rules.  
 
Both MMM and MMP have normative advantages. As Carey and Hix (2011) argue, the main 
goal of electoral systems is to achieve accurate representation of voters’ preferences while 
preserving highly-accountable governments. According to them, mixed-member systems, 
among other kinds of electoral rules, are able to achieve this ‘electoral sweet spot’. However, 
there are differences between the two types of mixed-member systems in this regard. Because 
of its proportional nature, MMP rules generate, for example, assemblies that better reproduce 
the pluralism of opinions in society. By contrast, the likelihood of forming stable single-party 
governments is in principle higher under MMM rules. Moreover, MMM systems have the 
advantage of being much simpler, and thus easier to understand for voters. Despite these 
differences with regard to their effects, the literature on electoral reform finds that the factors 
that led to the adoption of the two types of mixed-member systems are very similar: In most 
instances, they emerged out of a compromise between those seeking to avoid an extremely 
                                                 
3 Sometimes in MMP systems, a party wins more SMD seats than what it is entitled given its vote share in the 
PR tier. In spite of these overhang seats, most MMP systems produce electoral outcomes that are very close to 
pure proportional representation.  
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majoritarian system and those advocating less proportional rules (Shugart and Wattenberg 
2001).4 
 
In this paper, we argue that the presence or absence of a seat linkage between tiers should be 
associated to the proportion of split-ticket votes. We assume that vote choice is a function of 
voters’ preferences (over parties and candidates) and expectations regarding electoral results. 
As a general rule, a citizen votes for her favourite party/candidate because she wants this 
party/candidate to be elected. However, when she anticipates that her favourite 
party/candidate has little chances of winning, she deserts it and votes for the party she likes 
the most among those that have better electoral prospects. In doing so, she maximizes the 
chances that her vote has an effect on the electoral outcome. 
 
As mentioned above, the literature documents two main types of split-ticket votes in mixed-
member systems. These types are valid for both MMP and MMM. First, there are strategic 
split-ticket votes that are usually cast by supporters of small parties. The seat allocation in the 
SMD tier favours large parties, and small parties have little chances of winning a seat there. 
Therefore, supporters of small parties have incentives to desert their favourite candidate in 
the SMD. By contrast, as most parties have good chances to win at least one seat in the PR 
tier, small parties’ supporters do not have any incentive to desert their favourite party at the 
PR level. As a result of these different incentives across tiers, they cast a split-ticket vote. 
 
                                                 
4 Although we find no evidence for this in the literature, it is important to note that the differences in terms of 
voting behaviour that we observe between MMM and MMP might have existed prior to the implementation of 
these systems. In that case, the legislators might have adapted the electoral systems to these pre-existing 
behaviours. For this reason, we need to be cautious when we interpret the results. The association we observe 
might not be causal. 
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Second, some split-ticket votes are sincere (Plescia 2016; Riera 2009). This happens when 
voters have diverging preferences over parties and candidates across tiers. Some voters have 
a strong preference for a candidate competing in the SMD tier that is not from their favourite 
party. Then, even if their favourite candidate and party have good chances of winning seats at 
both tiers, they will be likely to cast a split-ticket vote as well: They will vote for their 
favourite candidate even if she belongs to a different party at the SMD tier, and they will vote 
for their favourite party at the PR tier. 
 
These two types of split-ticket votes should be found under both MMM and MMP rules. 
However, and this is the core of our argument, voters have more incentives to desert their 
favourite party in the SMD tier of MMP systems, even if this party has good chances of 
winning the race, because this behaviour will not usually have consequences for the 
allocation of seats between parties. At the end of the day, results in the SMD tier do not in 
principle affect the partisan composition of the parliament under MMP rules.5 Hence, the seat 
share of a voter’s favourite party would not decrease if they do not vote for it at the SMD 
race when the tiers are linked. In MMP systems, parties’ seat shares only depend on vote 
shares in the PR tier. Thus, voters should feel freer to desert their favourite party in the SMD 
tier of MMP systems and, as a result, split-tickets votes should be more likely. 
 
In sum, in both MMM and MMP systems, vote choice in the PR tier is a function of voters’ 
preferences over candidates and parties, and expectations regarding the electoral results. 
Under MMM, vote choice in the SMD tier is a function of the three same factors. However, 
under MMP, vote choice in the SMD tier is only a function of voters’ preferences over 
                                                 
5 The only exception to this rule is the situation in which there are not enough PR seats to fully compensate for 
the deviations brought about by SMD seats. However, this situation only happens under rare circumstances, and 
its overall effect on the partisan composition of the parliament is usually marginal. 
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candidates and expectations regarding the electoral results. The vote in the SMD tier does not 
have any effect on parties’ seat shares. Therefore, voters’ preferences over parties should not 
directly affect vote choice in the SMD tier under MMP rules.6 The implication of this theory 
is that the proportion of split-ticket votes should be larger in MMPs than in MMMs.7  
 
DATA AND METHOD 
 
In order to give some empirical evidence to our general intuition, we use the four waves of 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset. The CSES is a collaborative 
program that gathers data from post-election surveys in almost 50 countries.8 The first wave 
of the CSES includes elections that took place between 1996 and 2001, the second wave 
includes elections between 2001 and 2006, the third wave includes elections between 2006 
and 2011, and the fourth wave includes elections from 2011 onwards. 
 
Despite the availability of around 150 elections in all four CSES waves, we restrict our 
analysis to 11 parliamentary elections held under mixed-member rules for which voters had 
two votes. Mexico, for instance, uses a mixed-member system in which voters have only one 
vote (see above). Mexican elections are then excluded from the analyses. We also exclude 
Albania 2005, Hungary 2002, Taiwan 2012, and Thailand 2007 and 2011 because the voters’ 
district identifier is missing. Finally, we exclude South Korea in 2004 and 2008 because 
some relevant independent variables are missing as well. 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that preferences over parties migth still have an indirect effect on vote choice in the 
SMD tier under MMP rules. In particular, a voter might like a candidate because she likes the candidate’s party. 
7 If this line of reasoning is right, and the likelihood of casting a split-ticket vote depends on the type of mixed-
member, understanding the exact operation of the rules would emerge as a crucial mechanism in the explanation 
of this pattern. Results of preliminary analyses in this regard displayed in Tables A6 and A7 and Figures A2 and 
A3 of the Online Appendix seem to suggest that this is the case. 
8 http://www.cses.org/about.htm (30/08/2015). 
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In order to increase the number of elections, we add seven additional post-election surveys to 
the CSES data. These are Italy 2001 (Italian National Election Study), New Zealand 1999 
and 2005 (New Zealand Election Studies), Scotland 1999 (Scottish Social Attitudes), and 
Wales 1999, 2003 (Welsh Social Attitudes), and 2007 (Welsh Assembly Election Studies). 
All these elections were held under mixed-member electoral rules. 
 
The dependent variable in our analyses (i.e., split-ticket voting) is coded 1 if the respondent 
voted for two different parties in the two electoral tiers, and 0 otherwise. As for the typology 
of mixed-member systems, we rely on Shugart and Wattenberg’s (2001) distinction between 
MMP and MMM systems. Specifically, MMP systems include Germany (five elections, 
1998-2013), New Zealand (six elections, 1996-2011), Scotland (one election, 1999), and 
Wales (three elections, 1999-2007). For MMM systems, we have data from Hungary (one 
election, 1998), Italy (one election, 2001), and Japan (one election, 1996). 
 
We add three types of control variables. At the individual level, we control for gender, age, 
education (from no education to university degree), partisanship (thinking of yourself as a 
supporter of/feeling close to a party or not), and distance from contention in the SMD tier. 
This last variable is calculated taking the difference in vote shares between the preferred 
party and the second top contender in the SMD tier. We bound it to 0 for respondents whose 
preferred party is one of the top two contenders in the district. The preferred party is 
identified using party-liking scales. In each survey, respondents were asked how much they 
like each party on a scale from 0 to 10. The preferred party is the party to which the 
respondent gives the highest score. In case of ties (e.g., a respondent giving a score of 10 to 
two parties), we consider that the party the respondent voted for in the PR tier is her preferred 
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party. As mentioned above, literature on mixed-member systems usually assumes that voters 
cast a list vote in favour of their preferred party. 
 
At the district-level, we control for marginality in the nominal tier. This is calculated as the 
difference in vote shares between the two top contenders. We interact district marginality 
with a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent prefers one of the two top 
candidates at the district-level, and 0 otherwise. We expect the relationship between district 
marginality and the likelihood of split-ticket voting to be different for supporters of one of the 
two top candidates (positive effect) and supporters of other parties (negative effect). These 
three variables together with distance from contention are meant to control for strategic 
ticket-splitting. Finally, at the country-level, we control for the effective number of electoral 
parties, the number of years since the inaugural elections held under the mixed-member 
system, and the fact of not being a democratic country right after the Second World War.9 
 
We decide to opt for a relatively parsimonious strategy with few controls. In a cross-sectional 
study aiming to explain variation in electoral behaviour, the inclusion of many and 
interrelated covariates in the models tends to only incur in endogeneity and post-treatment 
biases. Also, it is important to note that we do not have any variable measuring preferences 
for candidates in the SMD in our dataset. As mentioned above, preferences over candidates 
explain an important portion of split-ticket voting in mixed-member systems. We thus 
acknowledge that our results might be imprecise due to the omission of this important control 
variable. 
 
                                                 
9 Table A.1 in the Online Appendix displays the descriptive statistics of the employed variables. 
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In terms of method, we use hierarchical three-level linear probability models with random 
intercepts by election and district. This modelling strategy allows us to simultaneously 
estimate the effect of macro-level and micro-level covariates. Hierarchical models control for 
the fact that individuals are nested in interrelated clusters (i.e., elections and districts) and 
allow us to obtain correct standard errors and associated levels of statistical significance for 
our macro-level explanatory factor (Hox 2010). 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
First, we describe our data. Table 1 reports the proportion of split-ticket votes in each of the 
elections covered in our analysis. We see that this proportion varies from 5.72% (Italy 2001) 
to 38.48% (New Zealand 1996). These proportions are in line with case studies of ticket-
splitting in the literature (see above). Moreover, the average proportion of split-ticket votes is 
about 14 percentage-points higher in MMP systems than in MMM systems (30.63% 
compared to 16.53%).10 This is in line with our general intuition.  
 
Table 1. Proportion of split-ticket votes per election 
Country Elections % Split-ticket N 
MMP 
(mean = 30.63 [27.83]) 
   
Germany 1998 25.38 1631 
 2002 26.29 2613 
 2005 29.84 1766 
 2009 29.17 1508 
 2013 20.04 1467 
New Zealand  1996 38.48 3778 
 1999 35.21 5355 
 2002 38.3 1360 
 2005 29.89 3432 
 2008 26.6 1045 
                                                 
10 When we take the grand mean, that is, the mean of the means of the election subsamples, the difference is 
slightly smaller (i.e., about 10%) but it is still in line of our expectations.  
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 2011 29.73 1204 
Scotland 1999 19.42 1014 
Wales 1999 23.41 363 
 2003 19.77 450 
 2007 26.05 380 
MMM 
(mean = 16.53 [16.87]) 
   
Hungary 1998 14.67 981 
Italy 2001 5.72 2219 
Japan 1996 30.24 916 
Note: The first mean corresponds to the overall mean of cases for each type of mixed-member system, whereas 
the second one is the grand mean. 
Source: CSES (4 waves), 2001 Italian National Election Study, 1999 and 2005 New Zealand Election Studies, 
1999 Scottish Social Attitudes, 1999 and 2003 Welsh Assembly Election Studies and 2007 Welsh Social 
Attitudes.   
 
 
Table 2 extends the previous analysis into a multivariate setup incorporating the individual-
level, district-level, and country-level controls. As shown in Model 1, the type of mixed-
member system (MMP or MMM) has a statistically significant effect (p ≤ 0.01) on the 
dependent variable. In particular, the likelihood of casting a split-ticket vote is about 11 
percentage points higher under MMP rules. This is a remarkable magnitude given that the 
electoral system’s type is a macro-level variable. The results are practically the same in terms 
of magnitude (in all cases above 11%) and statistical significance (that is, p ≤ 0.01) when we 
include district-level (Model 2), individual-level (Model 3) or country-level (Model 4) 
controls. Overall, the results in Table 2 validate our theory. All the coefficients for the MMP 
variable reach conventional levels of statistical significance, and all of them have a positive 
coefficient and a non-negligible magnitude. 
 
Table 2. Hierarchical linear probability models explaining split-ticket voting 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Mixed-member  0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 
proportional (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Distance from   0.01*** 0.01*** 0.005*** 
contention  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
District marginality  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
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Like top local candidate  -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Like top local candidate*  -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
District marginality  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Age   -0.001*** -0.001*** 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Female   -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Education   0.11*** 0.11*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Party identification   -0.08*** -0.08*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Effective number of    0.004 
electoral parties    (0.02) 
Electoral system age    -0.001** 
    (0.0005) 
New democracy    -0.02 
    (0.06) 
Constant 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.22** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.10) 
Election variance 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0008) 
District variance 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Individual variance 0.189 0.181 0.178 0.178 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
N elections 18 18 18 18 
N individuals 31482 28706 27385 27385 
Log likelihood -18867.637 -16535.302 -15499.281 -15496.851 
AIC 37745.27 33088.60 31024.56 31025.70 
BIC 37787.06 33162.99 31131.39 31157.19 
Note: The dependent variable takes value 1 if the respondent votes for two different parties across electoral tiers, 
and 0 otherwise. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests). The specifications are three-level 
hierarchical linear probability models with random intercepts by election and district. Standard errors are 
displayed in parentheses.  
 
In terms of controls, Table 2 shows that voters’ age and party identification and the duration 
of the mixed-member system are systematically associated with lower levels of split-ticket 
voting. In contrast, voters´ gender, education, party system fragmentation at the electoral 
level and the fact of being a new democracy do never affect the probability of casting a split-
ticket vote. The introduction of party identification as an individual-level control variable 
could explain the lack of statistical significance of the latter: partisanship is arguably weaker 
in new democracies and voters as a result are more likely to cast a split-ticket there. In either 
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way, the introduction of just one new democracy in our analyses (i.e., Hungary 1998) makes 
us be cautious about the possible generalization of these findings. 
 
Preferring a party that is far from obtaining the SMD seat in the voters’ district has a positive 
statistically significant effect on their likelihood of voting for different parties across tiers. 
The effect of district marginality (and its interaction with the variable ‘liking a viable party at 
the district-level’) is somehow unexpected. Although preferring one of the two top candidates 
at the local level decreases the likelihood of casting a split-ticket vote, this effect is counter-
intuitively reinforced by the lack of competitiveness at the district-level. Moreover, the effect 
of district marginality is the opposite (i.e., positive and statistically significant) for those that 
do not prefer one of the viable candidates at the district-level. These somehow odd results 
might come from a measurement problem: We have calculated marginality using actual 
electoral results although voters might have different anticipations of the chances of each 
party to win in the SMD. 
 
We finally subject our results to several additional tests, all of which assess the extent to 
which the previous findings are robust to the selected cases and the employed method. 
According to Tables A2 and A3 in the Online Appendix, the results remain almost identical 
when we weigh the observations according to the sample size for each election or use a 
random subsample from each of them that contains the same number of observations. Table 
A4 presents another robustness check in which the reported coefficients do not significantly 
change when two- rather than three-level hierarchical models are specified. Table A5 
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provides a final set of tests in which we show the robustness of the findings when we confine 
our analyses to the CSES data.11 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
The distinction between MMP and MMM systems originally formulated by Shugart and 
Wattenberg (2001) has proved to be a useful framework for the analysis of the effects of 
mixed-member electoral rules on party systems. In this paper, we scrutinized a crucial yet 
neglected behavioural implication of this distinction: voter’s propensity to cast a split-ticket. 
We find that, in accordance with our theory, the proportion of split-tickets is larger under 
MMP, where the nominal vote usually lacks implications for the partisan composition of the 
parliament, than under MMM, where it always has. This association persists even when we 
control for classic explanations of ticket-splitting related to strategic voting.  
 
Bearing this in mind, we acknowledge that our analysis has several limitations. First, we have 
only examined one feature of the electoral system (i.e., the presence or absence of seat 
linkage between the SMD and PR tiers) without considering other country-level sources of 
heterogeneity and, above all, the different types of split-ticket voting that exist (i.e., switching 
from the preferred party to either a larger or a smaller party). Second, our relatively small-
macro N comparative approach suggests that we would need to pay more careful attention to 
potential outliers that can exaggerate the magnitude of the hypothesized relationships. Third, 
                                                 
11 The exact form of the lack of seat linkage varies and this may emerge as a potential problem because it could 
be argued that some elections drive the effect we identify. In order to test whether the existence of influential 
cases drives the found relationship upwards, we conduct a somehow jackknife analysis in which we exclude 
each election consecutively. Figure A1 in the Online Appendix plots the estimated coefficients and 
corresponding 95% confidence intervals of MMP on the probability of split-ticket vote resulting of this exercise. 
As can be seen, the effect subsists in all cases but one (Italy 2001), where the estimate falls slightly below the 
5% level of statistical confidence. 
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our analyses do not include crucial measures to elucidate voters’ motivations such as 
electoral expectations or preferences on the candidates. For all these reasons, we 
acknowledge that our evidence is more tentative than definitive. 
 
In spite of these shortcomings, we believe our paper makes two important contributions to the 
literature on voting behaviour and electoral systems. First, we give new insights into the 
study of elections under mixed-member rules. As mentioned above, most of the literature on 
the subject has explained split-ticket voting by resorting to voters’ strategic motivations. The 
results of this paper suggest that these strategic motivations are not the sole determinants of 
split-ticket voting. In MMP systems in particular, voters are not constrained by their partisan 
preferences in their nominal vote. As a consequence, they are more likely to cast a split-ticket 
vote.  
 
Second, our results confirm that it is really important for scholars interested in the effects of 
electoral systems on voting behaviour to consider the full complexity of the rules. We find 
that an element that might have been considered as anecdotal by many authors might have 
important consequences for voting behaviour. We therefore urge scholars to go beyond the 
mere classification of electoral systems in broad families depending on the electoral formula, 
and to also pay attention to more precise aspects of the institutional framework of elections. 
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